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ABSTRACT
When presented with a yellow Volkswagen and a red Ferrari,
how does the brain figure out which color goes with which
car? The binding problem refers to how the visual system
pre-consciously combines visual features of objects in the
physical world to create coherent mental equivalents in our
consciousness. I discuss why feature binding is a problem for
our brains despite its seemingly effortless resolution in every-
day life. Drawing from experimental cognitive psychology, I
demonstrate how it manifests in space and time.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The visual world that we are presented with everyday is
made up of a bewildering myriad of colors, shapes and sizes.
Our brains are well-equipped to prevent sensory overload
and separate the ‘wheat’ from the ‘chaff’, as it were, and
give meaning to all that we perceive. But this ability is
largely unconscious, seemingly instantaneous, above all re-
markably efficient. The question of how such unconscious
‘zombies’ in our brains collude to create an ineluctably deep
conscious reality in our minds is a long-standing yet unan-
swered one. Thus, fascinating though the enigmatic nature
of Mona Lisa’s smile or the aesthetic beauty of a red Fer-
rari may be, equally complex and mysterious are the cogni-
tive mechanisms that underlie our conscious appreciation of
those qualities.
One of the prominent topics of scientific inquiry into zom-
bies in the brain relates to the question of feature binding.
Simply put, it is the process by which individual features of
a physical object, like color, orientation, shape, etc. must
be correctly ‘bound together’ to create its mental represen-
tation before it can be consciously perceived. That is to say,
before we can ponder the beauty of either Mona Lisa or that
Ferrari, the brain needs to be able to correctly put together
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the individual parts of her face, as it must do with the lines
making up the automobile.
2. WHY IS BINDING A PROBLEM?
Because of the unconscious automaticity of binding in
our daily lives, we’re able to deal with the sensory over-
load with apparent effortlessness. But under appropriate
circumstances, the actual processing of visual information
that leads up to conscious perception can be experimentally
studied by inducing errors in the process, thereby demon-
strating the existence of a binding problem [4]. The prob-
lem itself can be boiled down to a simple question: When
presented with a red circle and a blue square, how does the
brain associate redness with circleness, and blueness with
squareness, and not the other way around?. This question
is rendered that much more interesting by our knowledge
of neuroanatomy elaborated on in the next section, which
tells us that information present in different brain regions
is drawn together to solve the binding problem. Hence, the
problem also serves as an illustration of how processes that
are the neural correlates of consciousness in the brain trans-
late electrical activity into phenomenological experience [2].
2.1 Climbing up the Visual Hierarchy
The visual information processing system is architected,
in some sense, as a hierarchy of processing layers. The eyes
perform the initial processing of light incident on the retina,
the output of which feeds up through a succession of layers
in the cortex. Neurons in lower layers of the hierarchy are
specialized to respond only to specific colors and orientations
occurring only in specific regions within our field of vision.
Effectively, early visual areas are organized as spatial maps
of primitive shapes and forms, where features like color and
orientation are loosely bundled together in regions in the
visual field. As activity propagates up the hierarchy, neu-
rons in upper layers respond to progressively more complex
shapes and objects and represent more complicated struc-
tures, but at the expense of spatial detail [3].
But where in this picture of the visual system does binding
come into play? It might seem that binding is not really a
problem at all, as the spatially localized bundles of features
in the early visual areas could be combined into coherent
representations in conscious perception. But as visual search
experiments have shown, these feature bundles are not dis-
tinct enough to subserve conscious experience. As we shall
see, evidence from visual search experiments demonstrates
that attention ‘glues’ together features of physical objects
into distinct and detailed mental representations.
Figure 1: Search for a differently rotated bar (left)
and a red vertical bar (right). After [6].
3. THE BINDING PROBLEM IN SPACE
Empirical study has demonstrated the existence of the
spatial binding problem, so called because the visual system
must correctly bind together the bundles of visual features
at different spatial locations in our field of vision. Exper-
imental tests of this phenomenon usually employ a visual
search paradigm, where participants search for a specially
designated target object amongst a collection of distracting
objects displayed on a screen. Over two decades of exper-
imentation have shown that we’re very good at detecting
the target if it has a single distinctive feature represented
in early visual areas, like either color or orientation. But
in contrast, if the target is identifiable only by a distinctive
conjunction of such features, the task becomes a whole lot
harder.
The problem becomes intuitively clear in the sample search
arrays in Fig. 1. Finding an oddly oriented bar in the left
array is almost instantaneous and effortless. This is because
the target bar has a unique feature that makes it ‘pop out’:
its orientation. The proverbial mind’s eye is automatically
drawn to the target. On the other hand, finding a red ver-
tical bar in the right array takes more work. The mind’s
eye must ‘rove’ the array as it is guided to the region likely
to contain the target, after which attention must bind to-
gether the bundles of colors and orientations to create well-
defined mental objects before one of them can be selected.
We constantly use this so-called ’spotlight’ of attention to
selectively filter out irrelevant details and zoom in to salient
ones in the world around us. Numerous experiments like this
have shown that attention acts as the binding glue that is
applied unconsciously to groups of spatial features to solve
the binding problem and subserve conscious experience [5].
4. THE BINDING PROBLEM IN TIME
The real world presents us with a dynamic and ever-
changing visual environment where stimuli compete for our
attention not only in space, but also in time. As the stimuli
in our field of vision change continuously, so do the corre-
sponding spatial maps of their features in the brain. In other
words, at any given point in time, the features of the stim-
uli present at a given location in our visual field overlap in
time with the features of stimuli presented before and af-
ter it at that location. Consequently, the binding problem
has a temporal dimension to it, because in order to combine
stimulus features into coherent representations in our con-
scious experience, the visual system has sets of temporally
overlapping features to pick from.
This temporal variant of the binding problem shows up
in experiments that employ a rapidly changing sequence of
Figure 2: A sample stream of stimuli used in a tem-
poral binding experiment. Participants are required
to identify the red letter.
fleeting stimuli, presented one after the other at the same
location on a screen. An example of such a stream of stim-
uli is shown in Fig. 2, where participants must identify a
red letter amongst differently colored ones. Unlike in vi-
sual search, loose bundles of early visual features in these
experiments all occur in the same location in space, and so
close to each other in time that people consciously report
the identities of letters presented just before or after the
target. These errors reflect incorrect bindings called Illu-
sory conjunctions [1]. They are mental representations of
non-existent physical objects, which to our conscious selves
often seem as ‘real’ as correct bindings.
The data gathered from such experiments is used to in-
form our understanding of feature binding in the brain. In
addition to recording the kind of errors participants make,
we can get direct estimates of the dynamics of neuronal ac-
tivity related to binding processes by recording and analyz-
ing electroencephalograms (also called ‘brain waves’) from
participants. These electrical signals are evoked by neurons
in the brain as they process visual information, and sys-
tematically reflect underlying patterns of neural activity in
different regions of the cortex. Analysis of these patterns di-
rectly inform the mechanisms by which the binding problem
is solved by the brain.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has attempted to make a case for the existence
of a binding problem in visual perception, arguing that its
study gives us fascinating insights into the neural correlates
of conscious perception.
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